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Dispersed Trading and the Prevention of Market Failure: 
The Case of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
 
Abstract 
With augmented demands on power grids resulting in longer and larger blackouts 
combined with heightened concerns of terrorist attacks, trading institutions and policy 
makers have widened their search for systems that avoid market failure during these 
disturbing events. We provide insight into this issue by examining trading behavior at the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange during a major blackout. We find that although market 
quality declined, markets remained functional and some price discovery occurred during 
the blackout period suggesting that the NOREX structure of interlinked trading systems 
combined with widely dispersed trading locations may be a viable means of protection 
against market failure during massive power disruptions or terrorist attacks.  
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1. Introduction 
In August and September 2003, three massive power blackouts occurred in 
industrialized countries that are unprecedented in modern times. At approximately 4:30 pm on 
Thursday August 14
th 2003, a significant area of the Northeastern United States and Southern 
Canada suffered a severe power blackout in an area that encompassed New York to Michigan 
in the United States and from Ohio north into Toronto and Ottawa in Canada. At 12.35 pm on 
September 23
rd 2003, Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden were hit by a power blackout 
affecting almost half the combined population of the two countries. At 3.20 am on Sunday, 
September 28
th 2003, Italy was struck with a nationwide power blackout. The blackout impacted 
almost the entire Italian population.  
Of the three power blackouts, only the Danish-Swedish blackout occurred midday 
effectively shutting down a major Nordic financial market and allowing us to examine a unique 
event. The Danish market differs from other markets worldwide since it is part of the NOREX 
alliance of exchanges which consists of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE), Helsinki Stock 
Exchange, Iceland Stock Exchange, Oslo Børs, Riga Stock Exchange, Stockholmsbörsen and 
Tallinn Stock Exchange. It is the first alliance to implement a common cross-border trading 
system with a common set of trading rules and membership requirements meaning that financial 
instruments listed in Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo, Reykjavik, Riga, Stockholm and Tallinn can all 
be traded on the same system.  
The Danish market differs from many European markets (such as Euronext) in that 
substantial trading occurs off-exchange using the inventory of financial intermediaries where the 
financial intermediaries are “regular” members of the CSE. Trading can also occur through 
“remote” members (that have no physical presence in Denmark) and on Exchanges where CSE 
stocks are interlisted. So, although the CSE was shut down by the blackout, trading could occur 
through financial intermediaries in the Western part of the country that were not affected by the 
blackout as well as through remote members. Since the trading system, SAXESS, was housed  
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in Stockholm and outside the blackout area, real-time pricing and reporting continued to be 
displayed on the SAXESS system and would be visible to those with electrical power. 
NOREX rules have provisions for electronic emergencies like the blackout but contain an 
area of ambiguity where members representing more than 25% but less than 75% of the trading 
are down. On September 23
rd 2003, the CSE concluded that well-functioning trading could be 
maintained and decided to keep the system open. This decision was only feasible because the 
interlinked exchanges allowed transfer of surveillance to another NOREX Exchange (Oslo, 
Norway in this case) and because the SAXESS trading system was not affected by the blackout 
area.  
Increased concern over the future of European exchanges (e.g. Brealey, 1999), trading 
disruptions resulting from power outages and terrorist attacks implies that the interlinked 
NOREX system may provide a more reliable model for other markets since NOREX allows 
continued trading in most circumstances. For example, if Stockholm were to suffer an event 
similar to the one experienced by the London Metal Exchange (LME) on July 7, 2005 where the 
LME was within a police exclusion zone and could not open, SAXESS would continue to 
function by transferring operation to another exchange. However, even though trading of CSE 
securities continued during the blackout, the blackout significantly affected trading of CSE 
securities. 
In effect, the blackout created a partial trading halt affecting stocks listed on an entire 
exchange since communications were disrupted in many of Denmark’s major brokerage firms. 
The previous trading halt literature (e.g. Lee, C., M. Ready and P. Seguin, 1994, and Christie, 
W., S. Corwin and J Harris, 2002) examines trading halts of individual securities across time 
usually resulting from order imbalances created by the impending release or the recent release 
of information. Thus previous studies have examined trading halts while information flow 
continued. To our knowledge, no previous study has examined halts of information flow while 
trading has continued. We fill this gap in the literature by conducting a case study of the  
  3
September 23
rd blackout. This event allows us to examine the effect a substantial halt of 
information flow has on market quality and price discovery while trading continued. As part of 
our study, we survey regular member firms and query them on: (1) how they were impacted by 
the blackout; (2) their opinion on whether the exchange should have shut down; and (3) what 
measures (if any) they are undertaking to prepare for other disruptions in trading capabilities. 
Our study’s combination of statistical and survey analysis provides insights from this single 
event that can be useful to individual traders, trading institutions and regulators. 
With communication systems disrupted we expect and find a significant decline in 
trading for those dealers with trading systems concentrated in the affected area. We find the 
average number of stocks traded by regular (remote) members declined by 46.9% (9.6%) 
versus the control period. The average number of trades completed by regular (remote) 
members declined by 53.8% (11.3%) compared to the control period. The percentage decline is 
largely a function of the number of trading offices and trading office location with respect to the 
blackout. Some firms are unable to trade at all while others are completely unaffected by the 
blackout.  
We hypothesize that the decline in volume will result in increases in average spread 
width over the sample securities and a decline in price discovery. We find increases in spread 
width but also find the change in spread width is a function of the number of remote members 
trading in each security. We also find a decline in price discovery during the blackout period 
when compared to the morning of the blackout day but some price discovery continued to occur 
even with the significant volume reductions. Contrary to the blackout period, price discovery is 
nonexistent after the blackout to the open of the following day.  
While some argue the benefits of competition through centralization (e.g. Porter and 
Thatcher, 1998, and the SEC http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ny9948n.htm) and others argue 
competition through fragmentation, (see Tinic and West, 1972, Stoll, 2001, and Hamet, 2002), 
the blackout on the CSE provides a perspective not usually analyzed by either side: the  
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prevention of market failure by having dispersed trading locations connected to interlinked 
trading systems. Therefore, our study contributes to the existing literature on market 
fragmentation and centraliztion. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the institutional 
details for trading on the CSE, Section 3 the data and methodology, Section 4 the statistical and 
survey analysis, and Section 5 the concluding comments.  
2.  Trading Mechanisms and Institutional Details 
In September, 2003, the CSE listed 194 companies and had 43 members, 16 of which 
were remote members operating from London, Paris, Stockholm and Oslo.
1 Local or regular 
members are banks and brokers with a physical presence in Denmark and include discount 
brokers and securities dealers that are parts of or subsidiaries of commercial banks.  
The CSE does not use a central trading floor and trading is fully computerized. The 
trading system is called SAXESS which is developed and marketed by the Swedish firm OMX.
2 
The core of SAXESS is an electronic limit order book with price-time priority for round lot orders. 
Odd lot orders are executed at the latest round lot price. Odd lot orders executed outside the 
trading system are not reported to the Exchange. A Round lot is not a fixed number of shares 
but is defined as approximately 20,000 DKK (1 US$ = 5.60 DKK approximately) for KFX
3 stocks 
and 10,000 DKK for less liquid stocks. The order book is semi-transparent. Members of the CSE 
can see all orders and the member ID. Non-members of the CSE can buy access to various 
                                                  
1 A remote member is a member with no physical presence in Denmark.  
2 The system is also used on the Helsinki, Stockholm, Oslo, Reykjavik, Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius 
exchanges.  
3 The KFX Index was introduced in 1989 and today contains the 20 most actively traded shares on the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The constituent shares are selected biannually at the beginning of 
June/December from a basic portfolio of the 25 most active shares. The actual replacement of the 
portfolio of 20 shares takes place in June/December in connection with the expiration of the KFX 
contracts. The KFX Index is constructed so that it can be used as an underlying instrument for futures 
and options listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The KFX Index started on July 3
rd 1989, with the 
base number of 100.00 and is published throughout the trading day. At the end of 2003, the KFX 
companies represented 79 per cent of the total (index weighted) market capitalization of companies listed 
on the Exchange. The KFX Index is calculated solely as a value-weighted index.  
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degrees of transparency with 5 price levels on the buy and sell side the most common 
purchase.  
There is no formal market making system in the most liquid stocks in the KFX index. 
However, many members of the CSE post continuous two-way quotes in these stocks thus 
acting as informal market makers. Formal market making arrangements are confined to stocks 
in the small and mid-cap segments. In order for a listed firm to have its stock included in one of 
the official small- or mid-cap segments and the associated index, the stock must meet certain 
criteria in terms of liquidity and disclosure of information. Stocks that do not meet the criteria for 
liquidity can on a bilateral basis contract with a liquidity provider. 
CSE and NOREX rules allow for off-exchange trading as well as standard trades 
executed in the SAXESS system. For on-exchange trades investors place limit orders in the 
SAXESS trading system either through a member or by direct order routing through the internet 
(many members of the CSE offer this service). Matching limit orders are executed automatically 
by the SAXESS system. Many members of the exchange quote prices in their own proprietary 
trading systems, thus, effectively internalizing trades. Quotes must match or improve the current 
best bid/offer in SAXESS. Off-exchange trades must be reported (to the CSE) within 5 minutes 
after the trade is concluded. Trade reports must contain at least: security id, time of transaction, 
price, volume, settlement date, and the identities of the trading partners. Off-hour trades must 
be reported prior to the opening of continuous trading at 9:00 am.  
Only trades in a CSE listed stock where at least one part of the trade is subject to 
Danish Regulation must be reported. For example, a Danish member with a subsidiary in 
London does not have to report to the CSE those trades in which the London office is involved 
(see NOREX Alliance Rule 5.6.4). Trades for less than 1 round lot are not subject to reporting. 
To ensure accuracy in trade reporting, if both sides of a trade are required to report, then both 
reports are compared for accuracy. Disagreements between the two trade reports must be 
resolved or the trade is purged from the historical record. In the event that only one side of a  
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trade is subject to reporting requirements, that member reports the trade as an internal trade 
which is not subject to matching and is therefore not discarded (see NOREX Alliance Rules 
5.6.6 and 5.6.8). If neither side of a trade in a CSE listed stock is subject to Danish regulation 
that trade is not required to be reported to the CSE. For example, trading in CSE listed stocks 
between British traders in London would not be reported to the CSE.
4 
The CSE market opens at 9:00 am with an opening call and closes at 5:00 pm.
5 After 
hours trading is allowed and must be reported within the last hour before continuous trading 
resumes at 9:00 am. Pre-opening occurs from 8:00 am to 9:00 am when orders can be entered, 
modified, and deleted but no trades occur. A theoretical opening price is automatically 
calculated and continuously adjusted as orders arrive. The opening call starts at 9:00 am and 
finishes no later than 9:14 am. Uncrossing occurs for one stock at a time with the most liquid 
uncrossing first. Until a stock has uncrossed, orders can be entered, modified and cancelled. 
Similar to other exchanges, CSE tick sizes are a function of share price. Tick sizes have been 
reduced on several occasions since 1999. The most recent tick sizes in DKK are (with share 
price interval in parentheses): 0.01 (0.00-4.99), 0.05 (5.00 - 9.95), 0.10 (10-00-49.90), 0.25 
(50.00-249.75), 0.50 (250.00-499.50), 1.00 (500.00-4,999.00), 10.00 (5,000-19,990.00), 100.00 
(20,000 and above). 
3.  Data and Methodology 
We use data from the CSE for the period surrounding the power outage on September 
23
rd, 2003. The data contain all trades and quotes for all stocks traded on the CSE and are 
similar to the TAQ data published by the NYSE. Two major differences between our data and 
                                                  
4 During the time of our study, international stocks and depository receipts were traded in London on 
SEQI. On September 24, 2004, SEAQI was closed. Depository receipts were migrated to the order-driven 
International Order Book (IOB), and all equities were migrated to the order-driven International Bulletin 
Board (ITBB) 
5 This is descriptive of the market at the time of our study. Since that time the CSE has added a closing 
market.  
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the TAQ data are: (1) we know the member firms on each side of a trade; and, (2) we have 
aggregate depth at prices away from the inside quote.  
Many stocks on the CSE trade infrequently (in comparison to other markets such as the 
NYSE), so our study focuses on the more actively traded 20 stocks that constitute the KFX 
index.
6 Similar to other countries, the CSE allows trading of different stock classes. The KFX 
contains two classes of A.P. Møller-Mærsk and both stocks are included in our sample. 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for our sample and shows great variation among 
the stocks in all categories. Therefore, tests of changes in market quality measures that 
examine actual changes may lack power due to large variations induced by individual firm 
characteristics. For example a decrease in volume of 10,000 shares (the actual change) is small 
for a stock with a pre-period volume of 900,000 shares but large for a stock with a pre-period 
volume of 15,000 shares. Therefore, to increase the power of our tests we examine relative 





 where  j B  is the average for 
stock j on the blackout date and  j C  is the average for stock j during the control period. We use 
a matched-pairs t-test and a Wilcoxon Z to gauge the statistical significance of actual 
differences and a t-statistic for the average relative difference across stocks. 
The September 23
rd 2003, power outage began at approximately 12:36 pm and power 
was gradually restored starting at approximately 3:15 pm. Trading continued until the normal 
market closing time of 5:00 pm. To determine whether the power outage had an impact on 
market quality measures, we first define the blackout time period as 12:45-3:00 pm. We then 
adopt a two point procedure. We compare average values during the blackout with average 
values for the same hours on the five previous trading days and, to determine if trading on 
September 23
rd is representative of a typical trading day, we also compare an equal time period, 
9:30-11:45 am, on the morning of September 23
rd with average values for the previous five 
                                                  
6 See footnote 3 for a description of the index and its construction.  
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trading days. For both the morning and afternoon control samples, we obtain averages for each 
firm for each day, average across the five trading days, and then average cross-sectionally 
across firms. We then compare the control averages to the averages on September 23
rd. 
Changes in market quality measures attributable to September 23
rd should appear in both the 
morning and afternoon samples. Those attributable to the power outage should only appear in 
the afternoon. 
We examine several market quality measures including share volume and number of 
trades. Several authors including Taylor (2002) show that spreads are a function of information 
flow so we also examine the time weighted percentage quoted spread and volume weighted 
percentage effective spread using the inside quote prices and observed trade prices. For 
effective spreads we match trade prices to quotes in effect at the time of the trade. We also 
examine quoted depth which is defined as either the sum of the quoted size for the inside bid 
and ask or the aggregate depth quoted at all price levels (ask and bid). We do not partition by 
whether a quote is on the buy or sell side. Finally, we examine return volatility using 5 minute 
returns.
7  
To gauge the scope of the blackout on each member’s trading, we also examine the 
trading behavior of each member before and during the event. Since remote members have no 
physical location in Demark, their ability to trade should not have been affected by the blackout 
whereas regular members may or may not have their trading location in the affected area. 
Therefore, we separately examine remote and regular members. We only include member firms 
that had at least 20 trades in our sample stocks over the entire period which reduced the 
sample to 38 (13 remote and 25 regular members) out of the total 43 members.  
To measure price discovery we divide the day into three periods: pre-blackout (open to 
12:30), blackout (12:30-3:00) and post-blackout (3:00 to open on the following day) and use a 
                                                  
7 We calculate volatility using two different measures of expected return: zero and observed. We find 
similar results for both definitions. Therefore, we only report those for the latter method. Results of the 
former are available from the authors on request.  
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procedure similar to Barclay and Hendershott (2003). Barclay and Hendershott (2003) are 
concerned with the average portion of price discovery that occurs over night. Therefore, they 
average across stocks each day to find the proportion of price discovery that occurs in each 









































where S  is the total number of stocks observed in period i (zero returns are excluded), reti,s is 
the return on stock s during period i, and rets is the close to open return.  
Since we are interested in alterations to the price discovery process resulting from the 
blackout, we calculate the weighted average proportion of price discovery that occurs for each 
stock on average in each of the three time periods on the control days and compare that 
average to the corresponding period on the blackout day. Trading not completed during the 
blackout period may spill over to the following trading day. Therefore, we also examine price 
contribution on the day following the blackout. 
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where WPCs,i is the weighted price contribution for stock s in period i in the control period, rets,t 
is the open to open return on stock s on day t, and rets,i,t is the return on stock s for period i on 
day t. Since there is a single blackout day, the individual stock computation for the blackout day 
reduces to:  
B s
B i s
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where rets,i,B is the return on stock s for period i on the blackout day, and rets,B is the return on 
stock s from the opening trade on the blackout day until either the opening or closing trade the 
following day. We then average across stocks to determine the price discovery component for 
each time period. 
4. Results 
Table 2 contains the comparison of 9:30-11:45 am on September 23
rd with the control 
sample and shows that none of the market quality measures are statistically different from 
averages for the previous five trading days (number of trades is statistically significant at the 
10% level). Average volume declined by 19,126 shares on September 23
rd versus the control 
sample but relative volume increased by 24.2% which is not significant at normal levels. We 
therefore conclude that September 23
rd began as a “normal” trading day. 
4.1   Survey of Members 
To better understand the dispersion of regular member trading during the blackout we 
conduct an e-mail survey of all regular member firms asking for information on trading locations 
and how the blackout affected their firm. We obtained responses from 20 of the 24 regular 
members.
8 Of those responding, two returned blank surveys, three replied that they refused to 
respond, and 15 (63% of the 24 regular members) provided answers to the survey. The 
Appendix contains the survey questions and answers. Beside each answer is either the number 
of respondents that gave that answer or where appropriate the respondents’ average.  
The survey shows that members had a fairly even split between institutional and retail 
order flow and that 13 of the respondents had their main trading location in Copenhagen. Two 
members had trading locations in cities not affected by the blackout. Questions 3 and 4 reveal 
that 20% of the respondents had trading locations outside of Denmark. Therefore, some of the 
regular members were able to trade during the blackout. Question 7 highlights this point. While 
                                                  
8 Between the period of our study and the date of the survey Handelsbanken-Midtbank and Svenska 
Handelsbanken merged reducing the number of regular member firms to 24.   
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two members experienced no impact from the blackout, eight reported that 75-100% of their 
facilities (most likely 100%) were impacted. Question 8 indicates that phones, trading terminals, 
and internet connections were all impacted – but cell phone service was not. 
Since blackouts are unexpected events, there were a number of unexecuted orders in 
the system at the time of the blackout. The responses to question 12 indicate that only 3 of the 
firms attempted to cancel their outstanding orders. It may be that since they had little access to 
news, they believed that trading had stopped.
9  
Questions 14 through 20 provide insight on the member’s perspective of market quality 
during the blackout. Examining the responses to questions 14 through 16, we discover that the 
majority of members believed that spreads were wider and volumes lower during the blackout. 
However, their opinions on volatility are less clear. The largest group thought that volatility was 
the same, but there is roughly an equal split among the remaining members on whether they 
believed that volatility was higher (3 respondents) or lower (4 respondents.)  
If most of the members were correct and volume was lower during the blackout, then 
there may have been unexecuted trades. Question 17 attempts to understand when traders 
thought these unexecuted trades were completed. The largest response was that trades were 
executed over the days following the blackout. We bear this in mind when comparing trading 
quality measures later in the study. 
Question 21 asks if the members thought the CSE should have allowed trading to 
continue during the blackout. Eleven members answered no, while 3 answered that trading 
should have continued. Interestingly, only one of the three members answering yes indicated 
that they had trading locations outside of the blackout area. The fact that the CSE did not stop 
trading during the blackout indicates that Exchange officials were at odds with their member 
firms. The CSE became a for-profit corporation in 1996. Since trading did not stop during the 
                                                  
9 One member commented that they physically went to the CSE to try and cancel their unexecuted 
orders. They were unable to get into the exchange since the exchange doors are operated electronically 
for security purposes and no one heard the banging on the door (the intercom was not working either).  
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blackout, the CSE was able to continue to earn profits. There are interesting welfare 
implications involved in balancing changes in market quality during the blackout with Exchange 
profits. Those comparisons are beyond the scope of this paper. 
The last question deals with what changes member firms are taking in light of their 
experiences during the blackout. We find that five of the members are planning to invest or 
repair back-up power supplies, two are setting up alternative trading facilities, and seven 
indicate no planned changes. One respondent indicates that they will increase reliance on cell 
phones, which continued to operate during the blackout. This response indicates that perhaps 
exchanges should have mobile communications systems set up as a way to communicate with 
members (who can then trade) during a disaster. 
In the next section, we examine trading and market quality statistics and where 
appropriate interpret them in light of the survey responses. 
4.2  Member Trading Behavior 
Table 3 compares member trading in the blackout sample with the control sample. Both 
the average number of stocks traded as well as the average number of trades completed are 
reported. Panel A contains results for the 13 remote members and Panel B the 25 regular 
members in our sample.  
Table 3 shows that both remote and regular members experienced a decline in the 
number of stocks traded during the blackout but as predicted, remote members are less 
affected than regular members. Average remote member number of stocks traded declines only 
9.6% during the blackout while regular members experience a reduction of 46.9%. The 
difference (37.3%) is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The reduction in regular member 
trading is consistent with the perceptions expressed in our survey. 
Examining the results for number of trades by member reveals a pattern similar to the 
number of stocks traded. Average remote member number of trades during the blackout 
declined 11.3% compared to the control period average over the previous 5 trading days. In  
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contrast regular member trading declined 53.8% in the blackout versus the control period 
average.  
Table 3 shows wide variation among regular member firms. Some firms experience no 
trading during the blackout (e.g., Laan and Spar Bank) while others experience similar trading 
levels (e.g., Alfred Berg Bank and Sydbank). Although member firms have multiple offices, 
office locations may not be related to trading desk locations.  
Our surveys confirm that dispersed trading locations had a substantial impact on the 
prevention of market failure. Regular members with single trading locations outside the blackout 
area (e.g., Jyske Bank and Sydbank) were largely unaffected by the blackout. Those with single 
trading locations in the blackout area (e.g., Forstædernes Bank and GP Børsmæglerselskab ) 
were unable to trade at all. Those members which had primary trading locations inside the 
affected region, but also maintained trading locations outside of Denmark (e.g.,  Enskilda 
Securities and Handelsbanken) were able to trade, but at a reduced level. This finding implies 
that the combination of redundant surveillance systems and a geographically disbursed 
exchange membership (or an exchange membership with disbursed trading locations) 
substantially reduced the impact of the blackout and prevented complete market failure. 
Table 3 shows that regular members, on average, traded far less during the power 
outage and there is no reason to expect this reduction to be uniform across all stocks. To 
examine trading member activity on individual stocks, we follow the same methodology used in 
previous tests. We calculate the number of members trading in each stock during the blackout 
and compare that number to the average daily number for the same time period from the 
previous five trading days. We calculate relative differences for each stock and partition 
according to the type of member.  
Columns 2-4 in Panel A of Table 4 show there is wide variation in the number of 
members trading a particular stock during the blackout versus the control period. For example, 
the number of remote members trading ISS, Danisco and A.P. Møller-Mærsk B increased by  
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73.1%, 66.7% and 48.1% respectively while the number of remote members trading 
Topdanmark declined by 73.7%. The change in remote members trading dominated the overall 
average resulting in only two stocks, Danisco and ISS having an increase in the number of 
members trading.  
Stoll (1985) shows that spread width is inversely related to trading activity and Tinic and 
West (1972) show spread width is inversely related to the number of dealers quoting in a 
particular security. Therefore we examine the time-weighted percentage spread width for each 
sample stock for each 15 minute period between 12:45-3:00 pm on the day of the blackout and 
compare that spread width to the average spread width for same 15 minute period during the 
control period. We calculate the percentage of time that each stock’s 15 minute time-weighted 
spread is wider on the blackout day versus the control period.  
Column 5 of Panel A in Table 4 shows some relationship between spread width and 
number of members trading in a stock. For example, Danisco has 166.7% of the average 
number of remote members and 90.0% of the average number of regular members trading in 
the stock on the day of the blackout and spreads are wider than the control period only 33.3% of 
the time. In contrast Coloplast has only 38.5% (42.9%) of the remote (regular) members trading, 
and on average its spread width is greater than normal 66.7% of the time. The relationship is by 
no means one-to-one but examining the non-partitioned overall results reveals that only 3 of the 
20 sample firms experience a relative number of members trading that is at or above the control 
period average. The blackout spread levels for these three firms is wider than normal no more 
than one third of the time.  
To directly test the relationship between member trading and spread width, we calculate 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. Panel B in Table 4 shows the correlation coefficient 
for the overall results is a statistically significant –0.39. Therefore, we conclude that the inability 
(or unwillingness on the part of some) to trade negatively impacted market spreads during the 
power outage. We next examine the blackout’s impact on other market quality measures.  
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4.3  Market Quality Measures During the Blackout 
Table 5 contains results for the same market quality measures examined in Table 2.  
Comparing the results for the blackout in Table 5, to those for the control sample in Table 2 
provides evidence that the blackout significantly impacted market quality. Consistent with the 
perceptions expressed in our surveys, share volume and number of trades dropped by about 
50% during the blackout. Depth is reduced by about 25%. Percentage quoted spreads increase 
on average from 0.41% before the blackout, to 0.50% during the blackout which is consistent 
with the member’s perceptions. Percentage effective spread also increases from 0.39% to 
0.425%.  
The last column of Table 5 contains the number of firms experiencing a decrease in the 
relative quality measure. All but one stock experiences a decline in trading activity. More than 
half experience a reduction in depth and 13 of the 20 firms experience an increase in spread all 
leading to the conclusion that, although the market did not fail, the blackout did adversely affect 
market quality.  
Interestingly, Table 5 also reveals the fact that volatility declined from 0.23% to 0.15%. 
On the surface, we might conclude that the geographically disperse trading locations provided a 
sufficient trading base that volatility remained at a similar magnitude compared to the control 
period. However, Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) show that volatility is directly related to trading 
activity so a relative measure for volatility is required. One possible methodology to measure the 
relative decline in volatility is to regress volatility against the number of trades and a dummy 
variable as in Ronen and Weaver (2001); however, due to our relatively small sample size the 
regression has minimal power. We therefore adopt an ad-hoc method of scaling volatility by the 
average share volume for a stock in the same period. This method also has the added benefit of 
controlling for company specific as well as systematic volatility.
10  
                                                  
10 There may be company specific differences in the relationship between volatility and trading activity 
that regression will disguise.  
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Panel B of Table 5 contains scaled volatility for the blackout period as well as the 
morning control sample for comparative purposes. For the control period, column 4 shows that 
trading-adjusted volatility decreased on the day of the black out, but not by a significant amount. 
In contrast, scaled volatility in the blackout period increased by a statistically significant 92.2%. 
In other words, although Panel A shows a reduction in volatility during the blackout, the 
reduction is not as great as we would expect given the reduction in trading activity. Therefore 
we conclude that the blackout also increased volatility in the market. 
The fact that raw volatility reduced while scaled volatility increased may be the source of 
the dispersion in perceptions expressed in the surveys. Recall that there was marked 
disagreement among members as to the impact of the blackout on volatility. 
 
4.3 Control  Regressions 
Stoll (1985) has shown that spread width is directly related to volatility and inversely 
related to volume. The results thus far suggest that the blackout increased volatility relative to 
trading activity and reduced volume. It may be that traders widen spreads as a direct result of 
the blackout and not an indirect result of the changes in market quality. Accordingly, we control 
for changes in market quality measures to isolate the impact of the blackout using the following 
regression: 
it it it it Dummy Volume Ln spread + + + = σ β β β 2 1 0 ) ( %  
where for each stock i at time t, %spreadit is either percentage quoted or effective spread, 
Ln(Volumeit) is the natural logarithm of share volume, and σit is the standard deviation of 5 minute 
returns. For each stock there are four observations: 9:30-11:45 am and 12:45-3:00 pm for each of 
the control period or the blackout. If the observation is from the blackout period then Dummyit is 
given the value 1 and 0 otherwise.   
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Table 6 shows the parameter estimates for volume and volatility are of the expected sign 
and are statistically significant. The blackout dummy parameter estimate is positive and statistically 
significant for both percentage quoted and effective spreads.
11 This suggests that the blackout itself 
impacted spread widths, apart from its impact on trading activity. This finding would be consistent 
with an increase in risk due to a decrease in information flow resulting from a substantial reduction 
in communication ability resulting from the blackout. 
4.4  Where did the Volume Go? 
Thus far we have documented a reduction in trading activity which accompanied the 
blackout of September 23
rd. It may be that this trading activity loss merely reflected a delay in 
trading, i.e., trading was shifted to the period after the power outage (trading continued for over an 
hour and a half after the power outage ended). We also have noted that remote members 
experienced a reduction in trading activity which may reflect a shifting of trading to off-shore 
markets such as the LSE. If trading merely shifted to the period after the power outage, we would 
expect volume for the day to be roughly the same as days not affected by the power outage. If 
trading fled to off-shore venues we would expect volume to be lower on the day of the blackout.  
Accordingly we calculate the average daily volume for each stock for both the control period 
and the blackout day. We then calculate the relative volume for each stock, compute the average, 
and test for significance. We find that relative volume dropped by a statistically significant 25% on 
the day of the power outage.
12 Examining volume on the day after the blackout, September 24
th, 
we find that relative volume is over 20% greater than the control period average, suggesting that 
the volume that would have been executed during the blackout may have been shifted to the 
following day. 
4.5 Price  Discovery 
                                                  
11 Note that we also run the regressions with only two observations (afternoon) per stock with qualitatively 
similar results. The results are available from the authors on request. 
12 The t statistic is –2.93. Note that one stock, Group 4 Falck, had a few very large trades the day of the 
blackout. This caused its relative volume to increase by 125% for the day. We view this stock as an outlier 
and exclude it from the averages reported here.  
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Table 7 shows the results of the price discovery computations. Column B shows positive 
and significant price discovery during the control period in each of the pre-blackout (0.556), 
blackout (0.190) and post-blackout (0.255) timeframes. On the blackout day, column C shows the 
pre-blackout period (open-12:30) also exhibits positive and significant price discovery on the same 
magnitude as the control period (0.632). During the blackout, price discovery declines from 0.632 
to 0.333 which is numerically larger than the same timeframe during the control period (0.190) but 
due to the larger variance is only significant at the 0.10 level. In the post blackout period (3:00 to 
open on the following day) price discovery is virtually nonexistent with a value of 0.035 suggesting 
that although some price discovery is maintained during the blackout period, end-of-day trading 
provides no significant pricing information. 
Our survey indicates that members believe that trades not executed during the blackout 
were executed over the next day, suggesting that prices may have reversed on the day after the 
blackout.
13 Therefore, we recalculate the WPC measures from Panel A, but use the return for the 
period from the opening trade on the day of the blackout to the closing trade on the following day 
as our denominator for the blackout day WPC calculation. The results are contained in Panel B of 
Table 7. Comparing the results from Panel B to those of Panel A, for the blackout day, we find that 
the periods open to blackout and blackout are little changed from those in Panel A. However, the 
same is not true for the period blackout to open. On average, we find that the WPC is negative for 
the blackout to open period and nearly equal to the WPC for the period open to close on the 
following day. This analysis indicates that prices did reverse themselves the following day. The fact 
that the WPC is negative in the period immediately after the blackout is consistent with the notion 
that many traders simply went home during the blackout and waited until, the next day to trade.  
To investigate this finding further, we examine the frequency of trading by member firm for 
the period after the blackout ended until the market closed for the day. Similar to Table 3, we 
compare each member firm’s trading activity from 3:00 pm -5:00 pm on the day of the blackout to 
                                                  
13 We thank the referee for this insight.  
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the same time period during our control period. Examining Table 8, we find remote members 
appear to resume normal trading as evidenced by the group averages of about 95%. However, 
regular members appear to have continued the same level of trading apparent during the blackout. 
In particular, while the average number of trades for regular members increases from 29.2 to 52.8, 
the difference relative to the control period changes minimally from 46.2% to 45.0%. Examining the 
individual regular member firm results reveals that 5 of 25 firms (20%) exhibit no trading at all in the 
two hours after the blackout ended. This analysis implies that traders who could not trade during 
the blackout did not resume trading until the following day.  
Finding that traders did not immediately resume normal trading activity may be useful to 
exchanges and regulators. It suggests that in designing disaster contingency plans, planners must 
take into account the possibility of lingering effects on the level of trading even though the ability to 
trade has been restored. Therefore, planners should allow for a transition period following disaster 
recovery. 
5. Conclusion 
At approximately 12:35 pm on September 23
rd, 2003 Copenhagen, the major financial 
center of Denmark, and the surrounding area experienced a power outage that affected trading 
networks and telephones. Since trading of CSE stocks continued during this event, we examine 
the blackout’s affect on market quality. 
We find that effective spreads during the blackout are largely unchanged from the 
control sample even though relative share volume dropped by over half. Percentage quoted 
spreads increased by an average 0.08% and relative inside depth reduced by 26.2%.  
Our survey shows that member firms trading on the CSE are of three types: those with 
single trading locations within the blackout area; those with single trading locations outside of 
the affected area; and those with multiple locations with at least one outside the affected area. 
We demonstrate that there is statistically significant relationship between the number of 
members able to trade a stock and its spread width. Price discovery also declines during the  
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blackout compared with the pre-blackout period (0.632 versus 0.333) but is larger than the 
comparable timeframe in the control period (0.333 versus 0.190). 
While a large number of Danish trading institutions were unable to trade during the 
blackout and market quality declined, the market did not fail. Our findings suggest that the 
market remained functional primarily for three reasons: (1) the trading engine was located 
outside of the affected area (Stockholm, Sweden) (2) market surveillance, which is normally 
performed in Copenhagen, could be shifted to the Oslo Stock Exchange and (3) the CSE has a 
membership base with geographically dispersed trading locations.  
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Appendix 
This appendix contains the survey questions sent to the head of trading for the 24 
regular members of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange that traded our sample of stocks prior to 
the blackout on September 23
rd 2003. The introductory paragraphs are omitted. We received 
responses from 20 of the 24 members. Of the 20 returned, 2 were blank, 3 explicitly stated they 
would not answer, and 15 (63%) provided answers. Next to each survey response is the 
number of respondents who marked that answer (or averages where appropriate) in bold and 
italic text.  
1. How would you characterize your customers (please fill in a percentage in each category)? 
___ Institutional investors  average=46% 
___ Retail   average=54% 




3. How many locations does your firm have for trading equities listed on the CSE? 
_____ 1   12 
_____ More than 1  3 
4. If your answer to question 3 was More than 1, were any of the locations outside of Denmark?  
____ Yes   3 
____ No 
5. Was your firm physically affected by the power outage on September 23
rd, 2003? 
____ Yes   12 
____ No  3  
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6. If your answer to question 3 was more than one and your answer to question 5 was yes, were 
all of your trading locations affected by the power outage?  
____ Yes  
____ No   2 
7. Approximately what percentage of your firm’s trading facilities was affected? (For example if 
you were able to trade through an office on Jutland, but not on Sjaelland, you would answer 
50%). 
____ 0%    2 
____ 1% - 25% 
____ 26% - 50%  3 
____ 51% - 75% 
____ 76% - 100%  8 
8. At your MAIN trading location, what systems were NOT available during the power outage? 
 (Check all that apply)  
_____ Phone (land line)  13 
_____ Cell Phone 
_____ Trading terminals  13 
_____ Internet  13 
9. Were you able to do any internal crossing of existing orders (those submitted before the 
power outage) during the power outage?  
____ Yes   5 
____ No  10 
10. If you were able to trade during the power outage, were you able to report the trades during 
the power outage? 
____ Yes   5 
____ No  7  
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11. If the answer to question 10 was NO, did you report the trades by the end of trading on the 
23rd? 
____ Yes  4 
____ No  3 
12. For orders that were submitted to SAXESS before the power outage, but unexecuted at the 
time of the power outage, did you try and cancel the orders? 
____ Yes  3 
____ No  11 
13. For those orders you tried to cancel, what percentage of the cancellations were successful? 
____ 0%  1 
____ 1% - 25% 
____ 26% - 50% 
____ 51% - 75% 
____ 76% - 100%  2 
14. From your perspective was the volatility during the power outage higher, lower, or the same 
as usual? 
____ Higher  3 
____ Lower  4 
____ Same  6 
15. From your perspective were bid-ask spread widths during the power outage wider, narrower, 
or the same as usual?  
____ Wider  9 
____ Narrower  1 
____ Same  3  
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16. From your perspective was the volume during the power outage higher, lower, or the same 
as usual? 
____ Higher 
____ Lower  13 
____ Same 
17. If your answer to question16 was lower what, in your opinion, happened to the remaining 
volume? 
Note : some gave more than 1 answer! 
____ Volume was higher than normal the remainder of the day after power was restored to 
compensate  2 
____ Trades that would have been executed during the power outage were executed over 
the next day or so  9 
____ Traders switched their trading venue to one outside of Denmark   2 
____ The trades were never executed  4 
18. In your opinion did listed firms located outside of the power outage area refrain from 
releasing information during the power outage?  
____ Yes   1 
____ No  10 
 
19. From your perspective, were all stocks affected in a similar way?  
____ Yes   11 
____ No  2 
20. If your answer to question 19 was NO, can you briefly state why? 
Only 1 answer – Highly liquid stocks are traded elsewhere.  
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21. Should the Copenhagen Stock Exchange have allowed trading to continue in their stocks 
during the power outage? 
____ Yes  3 
____ No  11 
22. In the aftermath of the power outage, what changes has your firm made to prepare for a 
similar event? 
5 state they are investing (or repairing) backup power supplies 
2 state they are setting up alternate trading facilities 
1 states that they will rely more on cell phones  
7 state none  
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This table contains averages for the 20 stocks in the Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index (KFX) 
for the five trading days September 16 - 22, 2003 immediately prior to the blackout in Eastern 
Denmark on September 23
rd, 2003. Only standard quotes and trades during the normal trading 
day, 9:00 am - 5:00 pm are averaged. Listed are price and market value (in DKK), daily volume, 
and time weighted spread (in DKK).  
 
Company Price  Market  Value  Daily 
Volume  Spread 
A.P. Møller - Mærsk A  44,200.26 94,189,576,140  817  221.223 
A.P. Møller - Mærsk B  46,289.91 98,139,044,718  4,465  135.133 
Carlsberg B  275.65  7,786,850,385 53,411 1.189 
Coloplast  B  537.20 12,144,732,000 14,368  2.993 
Danisco 256.79  13,764,333,025  156,968  0.763 
Danske Bank  126.72  88,753,095,128  1,878,724  0.532 
DSV 210.54  4,270,977,459  40,607  1.247 
GN Store Nord  35.64  6,918,518,983  1,499,192  0.154 
Group 4 Falck  154.04  13,528,411,776  305,264  0.761 
H. Lundbeck  136.83  28,035,013,680 392,471  0.710 
ISS 307.67  12,860,503,634  195,823  1.030 
Jyske Bank  281.07  9,914,400,000  37,929  1.055 
NEG MICON  90.90  2,161,723,415  225,176  0.657 
Nordea Bank  37.01  13,477,532,031 1,374,911  0.153 
Novo Nordisk B  242.87  72,324,438,579  494,813  0.724 
Novozymes B  202.80  13,126,270,625  135,399  0.989 
TDC 207.21  44,659,932,292  843,943  0.617 
Topdanmark 282.22  7,358,709,573  118,324  1.581 
Vestas Wind Systems  122.10  12,343,216,203 455,843  0.643 




Change in Market Quality Measures for the Morning of September 23, 2003 
 
This table lists changes in overall market quality statistics for our sample of stocks for the period immediately prior to the blackout in 
Eastern Denmark on September 23
rd, 2003 as well as the day of the blackout. The sample consists of the 20 stocks in the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index (KFX) on that date. The measures examined include share volume, number of trades, time-
weighted percentage quoted spread, volume weighted percentage effective spread, volatility, and depth. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of 5 minute returns. Two time-weighted measures of depth are examined. Combined inside depth is the sum of depth at the 
best bid plus the best offer for a stock. Combined aggregate depth is sum of depth at all prices on the book for a stock. The control 
period is defined as the five trading days September 16 - 22, 2003. Averages are based on standard quotes and trades for the time 
interval 9:30 am - 11:45 am. For the control period we find the average for each day and then average across days for each stock. 
We then compute the 9:30 am - 11:45 am average for each stock on September 23
rd and compare that average to the control period 
average for each stock. Paired t-statistics and Wilcoxon signed rank approximate z-statistics based on actual differences are 





 where  j B  is the average for stock j on the morning of September 23 and  j C  is 
the average for stock j during the control period. We average all relative measures cross-sectionally and calculate t-statistics. The 
last column reports the number of firms with negative changes. 
 


















Share Volume  119,873  100,747  -0.89  -0.75  +24.20%  1.44  8 
Number of Trades  82.11  93.05  1.21  1.46 +20.90%  1.84*  6 
Percentage Quoted Spread  0.49%  0.48%    -0.50  -0.30 -2.70%  -0.58  10 
Percentage Effective Spread  0.405% 0.402%    -0.15  -0.08 +1.35%  0.30  9 
Volatility  0.28% 0.27%    -0.57  -1.01 -7.71%  -1.23  13 
Combined Inside Depth  14,619  12997   -0.73   -0.56  –0.3%  –0.04  11 
Combined Aggregate Depth  127,530  116,844   -0.62   -0.07  +2.20%  0.35  12 
 




Impact of the Blackout on Member Trading Behavior 
 
This table examines the number of stocks and the number of trades, from our sample, that each 
exchange member firm traded in for the period immediately prior to the blackout in Eastern 
Denmark on September 23
rd, 2003 as well as the day of the blackout. The sample consists of 
the 20 stocks in the Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index (KFX). Only trades during the defined 
blackout period, 12:45 pm - 3:00 pm, are included. For each member and for each trade type 
(number of stocks, number of trades) we list the average during the control period, the average 
during the blackout, and the relative difference between the blackout and the control period. The 
relative difference is defined as the average during the blackout as a percentage of the average 
during the control period. Panel A (B) reports the results remote (regular) members. The final 
row indicates the average difference between remote and regular members. Statistical tests are 
based on standard t-tests. 
 
Table continues on next page 
 
  
* Denotes significance at 0.10 level. ** Denotes significance at 0.05 level.  4
  Number of Stocks  Number of Trades 
Panel A: Remote Members  Control  Blackout  Relative Diff  Control  Blackout  Relative Diff 
ABG Sundal Collier AB  2.2 2  90.9%  33.4 20  59.9% 
Crédit Agricole Indosuez Cheuvreux Nordi  10  10  100.0%  66.4  65  97.9% 
Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd 5.6  7  125.0%  35.2  28  79.5% 
Deutsche Bank AG  3.2  4 125.0% 16.6  46 277.1% 
Fischer Partners Fondkommission AB  13  13  100.0%  163.4  185  113.2% 
Lehman Brothers International 8.8  7  79.5%  62.4  36  57.7% 
Merrill Lynch International  1.2 1  83.3%  7.8  1  12.8% 
Morgan Stanley & Co. International Ltd.  13.4  11  82.1% 121.2  69  56.9% 
NeoNet Securities AB  6.8  7  102.9%  41.4  32  77.3% 
NordNet AB   10.6  10  94.3%  41.4  50  120.8% 
Stocknet-Aston Securities ASA 12.2  6  49.2%  41.2  31  75.2% 
Tullet & Tokyo Liberty (Equities) Ltd  1.4  0  0.0%  10.8  0  0.0% 
UBS Warburg  5.6  8  142.9%  20.8  26  125.0% 
Remote Member Average  7.2 6.6  90.4%  50.9 45.3  88.7% 
Panel B: Regular Members           
Arbejdernes Landsbank A/S  3.6 0  0.0%  6  0 0.0% 
Alfred Berg Bank A/S  12  11  91.7%  172.4  166  96.3% 
Alm. Brand Bank A/S  12  3 25.0% 70.8  7  9.9% 
Amagerbanken A/S  10.2  1  9.8% 29.6  1  3.4% 
Amtssparekassen Fyn A/S  8.2 8  97.6%  15.6 32  205.1% 
Carnegie Bank A/S  9.2  17 184.8% 81.4  104 127.8% 
Danske Bank A/S  19.6  10 51.0% 350.4  43  12.3% 
Dexia P-H Private Bank Denmark A/S  1.8  0  0.0%  2.2  0  0.0% 
E*Trade Bank Danmark  A/S  15.4  14  90.9%  70  51  72.9% 
Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Sec. Ltd.  0.6  0  0.0% 1.4  0 0.0% 
Enskilda Securities AB  14  9  64.3%  123.2  37  30.0% 
Forstædernes Bank A/S  3  0  0.0%  5.6  0  0.0% 
GP Børsmæglerselskab A/S  3.8 0  0.0%  15.4 0 0.0% 
Gudme Raaschou Bankaktieselskab 2.2  1  45.5%  6.6  1  15.2% 
Henton Børsmæglerselskab  0.4 0  0.0% 1.2  0 0.0% 
Jyske Bank A/S  14.4  13  90.3%  68.6  47  68.5% 
Kaupthing Bank A/S  4  2  50.0%  16.6  3  18.1% 
Lån & Spar Bank A/S  3  0  0.0%  8  0  0.0% 
Handelsbanken – Midtbank  7.6  9  118.4%  17  11  64.7% 
Nordea Securities AB  18.6  15  80.6%  198.6  112  56.4% 
Nykredit Bank  9  4  44.4%  26.2  8  30.5% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken A/S  7  3  42.9%  26.6  6  22.6% 
Spar Nord Bankaktieselskab  9  10  111.1%  19.6  39  199.0% 
Svenska Handelsbanken (filial)  13  2  15.4%  80.8  2  2.5% 
Sydbank A/S  14.8  17  114.9%  51.2  61  119.1% 
Regular Member Average  8.7 6.0  53.1%  58.6 29.2  46.2% 
Overall Average  8.2 6.2  65.9%  56.0 34.7  60.7% 
Difference Between Remote and Regular     37.3%**      42.6%*  
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Table 4 
Comparison of Members Trading Each Stock 
 
This table compares the number of member firms trading in each stock during the September 
23
rd, 2003 blackout in eastern Denmark with the average number of firms during a control period 
prior to the blackout. The sample consists of the 20 stocks in the Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
Index (KFX) on that date. The blackout began at 12:36 pm and power was restored around 3:15 
pm. The period 12:45 pm - 3:00 pm is set as the blackout period and only trades that occurred 
between those two times are included (on both the blackout day and the control period). The 
control period is defined as the five trading days September 16 - 22, 2003. Panel A. lists the 
percentage of member firms that traded a stock during the blackout as compared to the average 
number trading that stock during the control period. Member firms are partitioned by whether 
they are remote or regular members. The percentage for each group as well as overall is listed. 
The final column of Panel A. lists the percentage of 15 minute intervals during the blackout 
period that the time-weighted spread was greater than the same period in the control period. 
Panel B. reports the Spearman rank correlation statistics between the number trading and the 
percentage of time spread is wider. 
 
A. Comparison of Members Trading During Blackout with Control period 
  Percentage of Normal Number Trading 
Company  Remote Regular Overall 




A.P. Møller-Mærsk A  111.1%  96.2%  98.4%  100.0% 
A.P. Møller-Mærsk B  148.1%  75.0%  93.5%  77.8% 
Carlsberg B  104.2%  57.1% 76.3%  33.3% 
Coloplast  B  38.5% 42.9% 41.7%  66.7% 
Danisco 166.7%  90.9%  115.9%  33.3% 
Danske  Bank  104.7% 75.0% 85.4%  0.0% 
DSV  62.5% 81.1% 77.8%  11.1% 
GN Store Nord  58.8% 54.1% 55.6%  44.4% 
Group 4 Falck  80.6%  58.8% 67.1%  0.0% 
H. Lundbeck  90.9%  75.3% 78.9%  11.1% 
ISS 173.1%  79.5%  114.3%  33.3% 
Jyske  Bank  100.0% 34.5% 51.3%  77.8% 
NEG  MICON  45.5% 87.0% 76.9%  44.4% 
Nordea Bank  52.6%  18.5% 27.4%  100.0% 
Novo Nordisk B  90.9%  50.7%  63.7%  44.4% 
Novozymes B  83.3%  108.1% 100.0%  11.1% 
TDC  87.5% 91.7% 90.0%  0.0% 
Topdanmark  26.3% 36.6% 33.3%  100.0% 
Vestas Wind Systems  86.2% 50.7% 61.2%  55.6% 
William Demant Holding  31.3% 105.3%  83.3%  100.0% 
       
B. Spearman Rank Correlation: % of Members Trading with % of Time Spread is Wider 
Correlation Coefficient   –0.28
  –0.34
  –0.39*
   
 
* Denotes significance at 0.10 level. 
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Table 5 
Change in Market Quality Measures During the Blackout of September 23, 2003 
 
This table lists changes in overall market quality statistics for our sample of stocks for the period immediately prior to the blackout in 
eastern Denmark on September 23
rd, 2003 as well as the day of the blackout. The sample consists of the 20 stocks in the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index (KFX) on that date. Panel A. lists the measures examined: share volume, number of trades, 
time-weighted percentage quoted spread, volume weighted percentage effective spread, volatility, and depth. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of 5 minute returns. Two measures of depth are examined, but both are time-weighted. Combined inside depth is 
the sum of depth at the best bid plus the best offer for a stock. Combined aggregate depth is sum of depth at all prices on the book 
for a stock. The control period is defined as the five trading days September 16 - 22, 2003. The blackout began at 12:36 pm and 
power was restored around 3:15 pm. The period 12:45 pm - 3:00 pm is set as the blackout period and only trades that occurred 
between those two times are included (on both the blackout day and the control period). For the control period we find the 12:45 pm -
3:00 pm average for each day and then average across days for each stock. We then compute the average for each stock on 
September 23
rd and compare that average to the control period average for each stock. Paired t-statistics and Wilcoxon signed rank 





 where  j B  is the 
average for stock j during the blackout on September 23
rd and  j C  is the average for stock j during the control period. We average all 
relative measures cross-sectionally and calculate t-statistics. The last column reports the number of firms with negative changes. 
Panel B. corrects for trading frequency by scaling each stock’s volatility measure by the share volume over the same period, 
multiplied by 100. The same average methodology employed in Panel A is then used. 
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Panel A: Market Quality Measures 
Share Volume  89,209  34,238  -2.52
** -3.43
*** –54.0%  –6.43
***  19 
Number of Trades  63.7  35.8  -4.50
*** -3.45
*** –45.9%  –6.26
***  19 
Percentage Quoted Spread  0.41% 0.50%  1.83
* 1.46   18.6%  1.98*  7 
Percentage Effective Spread 
0.39% 0.43%    0.67  0.04 13.9%  1.15 12 
Volatility  0.23% 0.15%   -3.13
*** -2.73
***   -28.2%  -3.31***  14 
Combined Inside Depth  19,725 12,890    -1.20  -1.72
* –26.2%  –2.85
*** 14 
Combined Aggregate Depth  157,000 120,002    -1.33  -2.54
***   –23.6%  –4.27
*** 12 
  
Panel B: Scaled Volatility  
Control Period 9:30-11:45  0.85% 0.43%    -1.24  -1.53   16.80%  0.75    
Blackout Period 12:45-3:00  0.50%  1.04%   1.43   2.69
*** 92.20%  4.23
**    
 
* Denotes significance at 0.10 level. ** Denotes significance at 0.05 level. *** Denotes significance at 0.01 level. 




This table reports regressions results that control for variables known to be associated with 
percentage spreads for our sample of stocks. The sample consists of the 20 stocks in the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index (KFX). The model is given by: 
  
it it it it Dummy Volume Ln spread + + + = σ β β β 2 1 0 ) ( %  
 
where, for each stock i at time t, %spreadit is either the time-weighted average percentage 
quoted or effective spread; Ln(Volume) is the natural logarithm of share volume, and σit is the 
standard deviation of 5 minute returns. For each stock there are four observations: control period 
average and blackout period average for each time period 9:30 am -11:45 am and 12:45 pm -3:00 
pm. If the observation is from the blackout period then Dummy is given the value 1 and 0 




Dependant variable  Intercept  Volume  Volatility  Dummy  F–Statistic &
adj. R
2  





















* Denotes significance at 0.10 level. ** Denotes significance at 0.05 level. *** Denotes significance at 0.01 level.  




This table reports the average weighted price contribution (WPC) for the 20 stocks in the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index (KFX) for three time periods: open to blackout, blackout 
(12:30 pm - 3:00 pm), and end of blackout to either the open or close on the following day, for 
both the control period and the blackout day. For the five day control period the individual stock 













































, *  
 
where WPCs,i is the weighted price contribution for stock s in period i in the control period, rets,t 
is the open to open return on stock s on day t, and rets,i,t is the return on stock s for period i on 
day t. Since there is a single blackout day, the individual stock computation for the blackout day 









, , =  
 
where rets,i,B is the return on stock s for period i on the blackout day, and rets,B is the return on 
stock s from the opening trade on the blackout day until either the opening or closing trade the 
following  day. T-statistics are in brackets. Panel A contains results where the denominator 
return is from the opening trade to the opening trade on the following day. Panel B contains 
results where the denominator return is from the opening trade to the closing trade on the 
following day. Due to the longer period examined, Panel B contains an additional row which 
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A. Open to Open Following Day Returns 














End of Blackout to Open 






B. Open to Close Following Day Returns 














End of Blackout to Open 





Open Following Day to 






*    Denotes significance at 0.10 level. 
**   Denotes significance at 0.05 level.  
***  Denotes significance at 0.01 level. 
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Table 8 
Impact of the Blackout on Member Trading Behavior 
 
This table examines the number of stocks and the number of trades, from our sample, that each 
exchange member firm traded in for the period immediately prior to the blackout in Eastern 
Denmark on September 23
rd, 2003 as well as the day of the blackout. The sample consists of 
the 20 stocks in the Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index (KFX). Only trades during the defined 
period after the blackout, 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm, are included. For each member and for each trade 
type (number of stocks, number of trades) we list the average during the control period, the 
average after the blackout, and the relative difference between the post-blackout and the control 
period. The relative difference is defined as the average following the blackout as a percentage 
of the average during the control period. Panel A (B) reports the results remote (regular) 
members. The final row indicates the average difference between remote and regular members. 
Statistical tests are based on standard t-tests. 
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  * Denotes significance at 0.10 level. ** Denotes significance at 0.05 level. *** Denotes significance at 0.01 level.  12 
    Number of Stocks  Number of Trades 
Panel A: Remote Members  Control  Blackout  Relative Diff  Control  Blackout  Relative Diff 
ABG Sundal Collier AB  2.2 3  136.4%  50.6 12  23.7% 
Crédit Agricole Indosuez Cheuvreux Nordi  10 10  100.0%  97.4 96  98.6% 
Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd  6.6 4  60.6%  68.6 22  32.1% 
Deutsche Bank AG  5.4 8  148.1%  35.2 66  187.5% 
Fischer Partners Fondkommission AB  14 12  85.7%  380.4  260  68.3% 
Lehman Brothers International  12 11  91.7%  198 137  69.2% 
Merrill Lynch International  1.6 1  62.5%  6.8  3  44.1% 
Morgan Stanley & Co. International Ltd.  14.8 15  101.4%  191.8 161  83.9% 
NeoNet Securities AB  6.8 10  147.1%  33  78  236.4% 
NordNet AB   12.4 10  80.6% 63.4  15 23.7% 
Stocknet-Aston Securities ASA  15.6 12  76.9% 78.6  55 70.0% 
Tullet & Tokyo Liberty (Equities) Ltd  2 1  50.0%  15.8  9  57.0% 
UBS Warburg  5.2 5  96.2%  20.8 48  230.8% 
Remote Member Average  8.4 7.8  95.2%  95.4 74.0  94.2% 
Panel B: Regular Members           
Arbejdernes Landsbank A/S  3.2 2  62.5%  8.4  2  23.8% 
Alfred Berg Bank A/S  13.6 15  110.3%  201.2 213  105.9% 
Alm. Brand Bank A/S  13.8 2  14.5%  81.2 10  12.3% 
Amagerbanken A/S  10.2 0 0.0% 28.8  0  0.0% 
Amtssparekassen Fyn A/S  8.4 10  119.0%  32  36  112.5% 
Carnegie Bank A/S  11 15  136.4%  179.2  137  76.5% 
Danske Bank A/S  19.6 19  96.9%  400.4 227  56.7% 
Dexia P-H Private Bank Denmark A/S  3.8 1  26.3% 9  4  44.4% 
E*Trade Bank Danmark  A/S  16.8 14  83.3%  99  56 56.6% 
Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Sec. Ltd.  1.4 0  0.0% 6.2  0 0.0% 
Enskilda Securities AB  14.6 13  89.0%  194.6 162  83.2% 
Forstædernes Bank A/S  3 0  0.0%  6.6 0  0.0% 
GP Børsmæglerselskab A/S  5 3  60.0%  24.2  10  41.3% 
Gudme Raaschou Bankaktieselskab  3 2  66.7%  10.2  2  19.6% 
Henton Børsmæglerselskab  0.6 0  0.0% 0.6  0 0.0% 
Jyske Bank A/S  15.2 11  72.4% 56.8  55 96.8% 
Kaupthing Bank A/S  5.6 0  0.0%  16.6 0 0.0% 
Lån & Spar Bank A/S  4 0  0.0% 9  0  0.0% 
Handelsbanken – Midtbank  9.6 4  41.7%  27  4  14.8% 
Nordea Securities AB  18.8 19  101.1%  289.6 268  92.5% 
Nykredit Bank  10 11  110.0%  39.6 24  60.6% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken A/S  9 4  44.4%  29 8  27.6% 
Spar Nord Bankaktieselskab  11.2 10  89.3%  28  32  114.3% 
Svenska Handelsbanken (filial)  15 11  73.3%  152.2  32  21.0% 
Sydbank A/S  14.4 14  97.2%  60  39 65.0% 
Regular Member Average  9.6 7.2  59.8%  79.6 52.8  45.0% 
Overall Average  9.2 7.4  71.9%  85.0 60.1  61.9% 
Difference Between Remote and Regular     35.4%***      49.2%** Working Papers from Finance Research Group 
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